Best-response potential for Hotelling pure location games by Iimura, Takuya et al.
 
Best-response potential for Hotelling pure location games 
Iimura, T., van Mouche, P., & Watanabe, T. 
 
This is a "Post-Print" accepted manuscript, which has been published in "Economics 
Letters" 
 
This version is distributed under a non-commercial no derivatives Creative Commons 
 (CC-BY-NC-ND) user license, which permits use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and not 
used for commercial purposes. Further, the restriction applies that if you remix, 
transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. 
Please cite this publication as follows: 
Iimura, T., van Mouche, P., & Watanabe, T. (2017). Best-response potential for 
Hotelling pure location games. Economics Letters, 160, 73-77. DOI: 
10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.025 
You can download the published version at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.025 
Best-response potential for Hotelling pure location games∗
Takuya Iimura† Pierre von Mouche‡ Takahiro Watanabe§
July 3, 2017
Abstract
We revisit two-person one-dimensional pure location games a` la Anderson et al. (1992)
and show that they admit continuous best-response potential functions (Voorneveld,
2000) if demand is sufficiently elastic (to the extent that the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation fails); if demand is not that elastic (or is completely inelastic) they still
admit continuous quasi-potential functions (Schipper, 2004). We also show that, even
if a continuous best-response potential function exists, a generalized ordinal potential
function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) need not exist.
Keywords: symmetric games, location games, best-response potential games,
pure Nash equilibrium existence
JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative game)
1 Introduction
Location games date back to Hotelling (1929), originally as a two-person game of location
and price choice by sellers in a market depicted by a line segment. Hotelling assumed that
buyers are uniformly distributed, and each buyer always demands a unit quantity of the
product from a seller whose delivered price is cheaper. Thus, the buyers are assumed to
have completely inelastic demand. Smithies (1941) was the first who considered a situation
where demand of buyers is strictly decreasing in delivered price, i.e., a situation where
buyers have elastic demand. Here, the delivered price is decomposed into the mill price
and transportation cost that increases with distance. By letting mill price and per distance
∗This work is supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (KAKENHI) 25380233 and
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transportation cost be equal across sellers, we have a pure location game. A thorough study
of such pure location games is done by Anderson et al. (1992, Chapter 8.2). They showed,
in particular, that if demand is completely inelastic, or elastic but not too elastic, the two
sellers agglomerate at the center of the market at equilibrium, namely, Hotelling’s Principle
of Minimum Differentiation holds; if, on the other hand, the demand is sufficiently elastic,
the central agglomeration at equilibrium disappears, i.e., the principle ceases to hold true.1
See also Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for pure location games in general.
In this paper, we revisit two-person pure location games a` la Anderson et al. (1992),2
shedding some new light on them. We show that these games admit continuous best-response
potential functions (Voorneveld, 2000) if demand is sufficiently decreasing in distance3 (to the
extent that the central agglomeration ceases to hold true); if demand is not that decreasing
(or is constant) they still admit continuous quasi-potential functions (Schipper, 2004). Thus,
in these games, continuous potential functions are securing the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium. We also show that even if a continuous best-response potential function exists,
a generalized ordinal potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) need not exist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the game and give
some preliminaries. In Section 3, we show our main results. Some concluding remarks are
given in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The game
Denote by S the compact real interval [0, L], where L is a positive real number. Also, denote
by f a real-valued continuous positive function defined on [0,∞[ that is constant or strictly
decreasing. Throughout, f is assumed to be continuous and positive, unless otherwise stated.
We denote by G = (S, f) a two-person game in strategic form such that the strategy set is
S and the payoff functions ui : S × S → R (i = 1, 2) are defined as follows:
ui(x1, x2) :=
∫
Vi(x1,x2)
f(|y − xi|)dy + 1
2
∫
V0(x1,x2)
f(|y − xi|)dy (1)
1We note that their condition of agglomeration (Anderson et al., 1992, page 282, Eq. (6)) is equivalent to
(the converse of) our Eq. (8) that demarcates our two cases.
2To be fair, we note that their analysis of two-person pure location games is just an opening of their
comprehensive analyses of location games with more than two players, entry, and price competition; our
analysis is limited in scope compared to theirs.
3The decreasingness of demand in delivered price turns into the decreasingness of demand in distance in
pure location games.
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where, with {i, j} = {1, 2}, Vi(x1, x2) = {y ∈ S | |y − xi| < |y − xj |} and V0(x1, x2) = {y ∈
S | |y − x1| = |y − x2|}.4 We refer to f as a demand function.
This game is a symmetric game, i.e., the payoff functions satisfy
u2(y, x) = u1(x, y) ∀x, y ∈ S, (2)
which we will refer to as player symmetry. In addition, each ui satisfies yet another symmetry,
which we will call location symmetry:
ui(x, y) = ui(L− x, L− y) ∀x, y ∈ S. (3)
2.2 Potential games
There are several notions of potential functions (potentials, for short). Let N = {1, . . . , n}
and let ((Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a general n-person game in strategic form, where Si and
ui :×j∈N Sj → R are the strategy set and the payoff function of player i ∈ N , respec-
tively. For i ∈ N , s ∈×j∈N Sj , and s′i ∈ Si, we denote by s \ s′i ∈×j∈N Sj a strategy profile
obtained from s by replacing the ith element with s′i. Let P :×j∈N Sj → R. P is said to be
a generalized ordinal potential of G (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) if for any i, s, s′i
ui(s \ s′i) > ui(s) =⇒ P (s \ s′i) > P (s). (4)
P is said to be a best-response potential of G (Voorneveld, 2000) if for any i, s
arg max
s′i
ui(s \ s′i) = arg max
s′i
P (s \ s′i). (5)
If “=” in (5) is weakened to “⊇” then P is called a pseudo-potential of G (Dubey et al.,
2006). P is called a quasi-potential of G (Schipper, 2004) if for any s
si ∈ arg max
s′i∈Si
ui(s \ s′i) ∀i ⇐⇒ s ∈ arg max
s′∈S
P (s′). (6)
A game having a generalized ordinal potential is called a generalized ordinal potential game,
and so on. If a game G belongs to any one of these classes of potential games, and if
the potential therein has a maximum, then any maximizer of the potential is a pure Nash
equilibrium of G.
A path is a nonempty finite or infinite sequence of strategy profiles (s1, s2, . . . ) such
that every sk and sk+1 differ in exactly one, say the i(k)th, coordinate. A finite path
(s1, s2, . . . , sm) is called cyclic if sm = s1; trivial if m = 1. A path is an improvement path if
ui(k)(s
k+1) > ui(k)(s
k) for every k. It is known that there is no non-trivial cyclic improvement
path in a generalized ordinal potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
4We borrowed the notations Vi(x1, x2) of Prisner (2011).
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3 Analysis
3.1 The results
Let G = (S, f) and let ui : S
2 → R be defined by (1). As is well-known, the best response
may be empty if the demand function f is constant (f = c): Indeed, since
u1(x1, x2) =

x1+x2
2 c if x1 < x2
L
2 c if x1 = x2
(L− x1+x22 )c if x1 > x2,
we have
arg max
x1∈S
u1(x1, x2) =
∅ if x2 6= L/2{L/2} if x2 = L/2.
Clearly, this game does not admit continuous best-response potential (by Weierstrass’s The-
orem). As we shall see in Remark 3.1 below, the situation is not so different if f is strictly
decreasing and 12f(0) < f(
L
2 ), a situation where the Principle of Minimum Differentiation
holds true (Anderson et al., 1992, page 282).5 Let us first consider the case 12f(0) ≥ f(L2 ).
Let a, b ∈ S. We now let
L(a) :=
∫ a
0
f(z)dz, R(b) :=
∫ L−b
0
f(z)dz, M(a, b) := 2
∫ |a−b|
2
0
f(z)dz,
and express the payoff functions given by (1) as
ui(x1, x2) =

L(xi) +
1
2M(x1, x2) if xi < xj
R(xi) +
1
2M(x1, x2) if xi > xj
1
2
(
L(xi) + R(xi)
)
if xi = xj .
Define P : S2 → R by
P (x1, x2) := L(min{x1, x2}) + R(max{x1, x2}) + 1
2
M(x1, x2). (7)
Note that P is continuous irrespective of the continuity of f .
Proposition 3.1. G = (S, f) with S = [0, L] and a strictly decreasing f satisfying
1
2
f(0) ≥ f(L
2
) (8)
admits a continuous best-response potential P : S2 → R defined by (7).
5To be precise, it holds true iff 1
2
f(0) ≤ f(L
2
) (Anderson et al. Eq.(8.6)). See also our Concluding Remark 2.
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Proof. By player symmetry (2) and P (x1, x2) = P (x2, x1), it suffices to show (5) for i = 1.
Let
B(x2) := arg max
x1∈S
u1(x1, x2) and M(x2) := arg max
x1∈S
P (x1, x2).
By location symmetry (3) and P (x1, x2) = P (L − x1, L − x2), it suffices to show B(x2) =
M(x2) for x2 ≤ L2 . We distinguish two cases.
Case x2 <
L
2 : Note that
1
2f(0)− f(L− x2) > 12f(0)− f(L2 ) ≥ 0, i.e., 12f(0) > f(L− x2).
By the continuity of f , we can choose  > 0 such that  < L−x2− and 12f() > f(L−x2−).
If x1 = x2 then
u1(x1 + , x2)− u1(x1, x2) = 1
2
M(x2, x2 + ) + R(x2 + )− 1
2
(R(x2) + L(x2))
> P (x1 + , x2)− P (x1, x2) = 1
2
M(x2, x2 + ) + R(x2 + )−R(x2)
=
∫ 
2
0
f(z)dz −
∫ L−x2
L−x2−
f(z)dz >
∫ 
0
1
2
f(z)dz −
∫ L−x2
L−x2−
f(z)dz > 0,
where the first inequality is by L(x2) < R(x2), and the second by 2
∫ 
2
0 f(z)dz >
∫ 
0 f(z)dz
(due to the strict decreasingness). Thus x1 6= x2 if x1 ∈ B(x2)∪M(x2). Note that, if x2 > 0,
then for x′1 = x2 − h and x′′1 = x2 + h such that 0 ≤ x′1 < x2 < x′′1,
u1(x
′
1, x2) < u1(x
′′
1, x2) and P (x
′
1, x2) < P (x
′′
1, x2), (9)
since x′′1 will add (resp. increase) demand from the interval [L − 2x2, L] for u1(·, x2) (resp.
P (·, x2)), compared to x′1. Thus B(x2) = arg maxx1>x2
(
R(x1) +
1
2M(x2, x1)
)
and M(x2) =
arg maxx1>x2
(
L(x2) + R(x1) +
1
2M(x2, x1)
)
. Since L(x2) is a constant, we have B(x2) =
M(x2).
Case x2 =
L
2 : In this case, B(x2) and M(x2) are symmetric in that y ∈ B(x2) ⇐⇒
L − y ∈ B(x2) and y ∈ M(x2) ⇐⇒ L − y ∈ M(x2). Also, both u1(·, x2) and P (·, x2) are
continuous. Hence B(x2) ∩ [x2, L] 6= ∅ and M(x2) ∩ [x2, L] 6= ∅. We are done if B(x2) ∩
[x2, L] = M(x2)∩[x2, L] is shown. Now, as x2 = L2 , we have u1(x1, x2) = R(x1)+ 12M(x2, x1)
for any x1 ∈ [x2, L]. Observe that B(x2)∩ [x2, L] = arg maxx1≥x2
(
R(x1) +
1
2M(x2, x1)
)
and
M(x2) ∩ [x2, L] = arg maxx1≥x2
(
L(x2) + R(x1) +
1
2M(x2, x1)
)
, which, by the constancy of
L(x2), imply B(x2) ∩ [x2, L] = M(x2) ∩ [x2, L].
Remark 3.1. Let x2 <
L
2 . Then, with x1 = x2,
u1(x1, x2) =
1
2
(
L(x2) + R(x2)
)
< R(x2) = lim
y1↓x1
(
R(y1) +
1
2
M(x2, y1)
)
= lim
y1↓x1
u1(y1, x2). (10)
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That is, u1(·, x2) is not continuous at x1 = x2, and u1(x1, x2) < u1(x1+, x2) for a small  > 0.
Nevertheless, the condition 12f(0) ≥ f(L2 ) ensures that B(x2) 6= ∅ for every x2 ∈ [0, L] as
Proposition 3.1 suggests (in fact B(x2) = M(x2) 6= ∅ for every x2 ∈ [0, L]). If 12f(0) < f(L2 ),
on the other hand, B(x2) may be empty for some x2. To see this, observe that for y1 > x2
with x2 <
L
2 , u1(·, x2) is continuously differentiable at y1 and
∂
∂y1
u1(y1, x2) =
∂
∂y1
(
R(y1) +
1
2
M(x2, y1)
)
=
∂
∂y1
(∫ L−y1
0
f(z)dz +
∫ y1−x2
2
0
f(z)dz
)
= −f(L− y1) + 1
2
f(
y1 − x2
2
). (11)
If 12f(0) < f(
L
2 ), and if x2 <
L
2 is sufficiently close to
L
2 , then, by the continuity of f ,
(11) converges to −f(L − x2) + 12f(0) < 0 as y1 ↓ x2. That is, we have ∂∂x1u1(x1, x2) < 0
for all x1 > x2, since −f(L − x1) + 12f(x1−x22 ) is decreasing in x1. With (10), this says
that u1(·, x2) has no maximum on [x2, L]. Also, with (9), which also holds here, it has no
maximum on [0, L], namely, B(x2) = ∅, while M(x2) 6= ∅ since P is continuous. Hence in
this case P defined by (7) cannot be a best-response potential, nor even a pseudo-potential
since B(x2) 6⊇M(x2).
Before we proceed, we note that if (x1, x2) is an equilibrium of G, then x1 + x2 = L, and
the equilibrium is unique up to player symmetry.6 To see this, note first that (L2 ,
L
2 ) is the
unique equilibrium of G if f is constant. Asume then that f is strictly decreasing, x2 ≤ x1,
without loss of generality, and suppose x1 + x2 < L. If x2 = x1, then, by (10), we have
u1(x1, x2) < u1(x1 + , x2) for a small  > 0, a contradiction. If x2 < x1, note that
∂
∂x1
u1(x1, x2) = −f(L− x1) + 1
2
f(
x1 − x2
2
),
∂
∂x2
u2(x1, x2) = f(x2)− 1
2
f(
x1 − x2
2
),
and x2 6= 0 since ∂∂x2u2(x1, 0) > 0. Then ∂∂x1u1(x1, x2) = ∂∂x2u2(x1, x2) = 0 by the
first order condition, and f(L − x1) = f(x2), contradicting the strict decreasingness of
f . Hence x1 + x2 ≥ L. Note that (L − x1, L − x2) is also an equilibrium by location
symmetry (3), and the above argument also implies (L − x1) + (L − x2) ≥ L. Hence
x1 + x2 = L. For the uniqueness, suppose that (x1, x2) and (x
′
1, x
′
2) are two equilib-
ria such that x2 ≤ x1, x′2 ≤ x′1, and x′1 < x1. Then u1(x1, x2) ≥ u1(x′1, x2) implies∫ x1−x2
2
0 f(z)dz +
∫ L−x1
0 f(z)dz ≥
∫ x′1−x2
2
0 f(z)dz +
∫ L−x′1
0 f(z)dz, and u1(x1, x
′
2) ≤ u1(x′1, x′2)
implies
∫ x1−x′2
2
0 f(z)dz +
∫ L−x1
0 f(z)dz ≤
∫ x′1−x′2
2
0 f(z)dz +
∫ L−x′1
0 f(z)dz. Subtracting,∫ x1−x2
2
x1−x′2
2
f(z)dz ≥
∫ x′1−x2
2
x′1−x′2
2
f(z)dz.
6These points are also shown by Anderson et al. (1992). However, we include our proofs for the sake of
completeness.
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Since
x1−x′2
2 >
x′1−x′2
2 and
x1−x2
2 −
x1−x′2
2 =
x′1−x2
2 −
x′1−x′2
2 , this contradicts the strict decreas-
ingness of f . Hence equilibrium must be unique; it is unique up to player symmetry since
{(x1, x2), (x2, x1), (L− x1, L− x2), (L− x2, L− x1)} = {(x1, x2), (x2, x1)} by x1 + x2 = L.
Proposition 3.2. G = (S, f) with a strictly decreasing f admits a continuous quasi-potential
P : S2 → R defined by (7).
Proof. We show ‘⇐= ’ in (6), i.e., that any maximizer of P is an equilibrium. This and the
uniqueness of equilibrium (up to player symmetry) imply (6).
Suppose (x1, x2) ∈ arg maxs∈S2 P (s). Assume x2 ≤ x1 without loss of generality (by
P (x1, x2) = P (x2, x1)). Note that if x1+x2 < L, then for  > 0 such that x2+ < L−x1−,
P (x1 + , x2 + )− P (x1, x2) =
(
L(x2 + )− L(x2)
)
+
(
R(x1 + )−R(x1)
)
=
∫ x2+
x2
f(z)dz −
∫ L−x1
L−x1−
f(z)dz > 0.
Likewise, if x1 + x2 > L, then for  > 0 such that x2 −  > L − x1 + , P (x1 − , x2 − ) >
P (x1, x2). Since these contradict the maximality of P (x1, x2), we must have x1 + x2 = L.
Then L(x2) = R(x1). We distinguish two cases.
Case x2 =
L
2 : In this case that P (x1, x2) ≥ P (x′1, x2) for any x′1 ∈ S implies that
R(x1) ≥ R(x′1) + 12M(x′1, x2) for any x′1 ≥ x2 and L(x1) ≥ L(x′1) + 12M(x′1, x2) for any
x′1 ≤ x2. That is, u1(x1, x2) ≥ u1(x′1, x2) for any x′1 ≥ x2 and any x′1 ≤ x2, respectively
(note that R(x1) = L(x1) =
1
2(L(x1)+R(x1))). Hence x1 ∈ arg maxx′1∈S u1(x′1, x2). We also
have x2 ∈ arg maxx′2∈S u2(x1, x′2) by player symmetry.
Case x2 <
L
2 : (a) If x
′
1 > x2, then P (x
′
1, x2) = L(x2) + R(x
′
1) +
1
2M(x
′
1, x2) and
u1(x
′
1, x2) = R(x
′
1) +
1
2M(x
′
1, x2), so P (x1, x2) ≥ P (x′1, x2) implies u1(x1, x2) ≥ u1(x′1, x2).
(b) If x′1 < x2, recall that there is x′′1 > x2 such that u1(x′′1, x2) > u1(x′1, x2) (see (9)).
Since u1(x1, x2) ≥ u1(x′′1, x2) by (a), we have u1(x1, x2) ≥ u1(x′1, x2). (c) If x′1 = x2,
then P (x′1, x2) ≤ P (x1, x2) reads as L(x2) + R(x′1) ≤ L(x2) + R(x1) + 12M(x2, x1), so
L(x2)+R(x
′
1) ≤ L(x2)+R(x1)+M(x2, x1). Noting that u1(x′1, x2) = u2(x′1, x2) by x′1 = x2,
and u1(x1, x2) = u2(x1, x2) by u1(x1, x2) = u2(x2, x1) = u2(L − x2, L − x1) = u2(x1, x2),
this says that 2u1(x
′
1, x2) ≤ 2u1(x1, x2). Hence x1 ∈ arg maxx′1∈S u1(x′1, x2). We also have
x2 ∈ arg maxx′2∈S u2(x1, x′2) by player symmetry.
In passing, we note that G = (S, f) with S = [0, L] and a constant f has a unique
equilibrium (L2 ,
L
2 ), as is well known. Clearly, P¯ : S
2 → R defined by
P¯ (x1, x2) := −
(∣∣∣∣L2 − x1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣L2 − x2
∣∣∣∣) , (12)
for example, is a continuous quasi-potential of G.
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3.2 Non-existence of a generalized ordinal potential
Having established that G belongs to the class of quasi-potential games, and more strongly
best-response potential games (with a continuous best-response potential) if f is a sufficiently
decreasing strictly decreasing function, we now show that G is not necessarily a generalized
ordinal potential game, to narrow the class to which G belongs.
Proposition 3.3. G = (S, f) with a sufficiently decreasing strictly decreasing f is not
necessarily a generalized ordinal potential game.
Proof. If G has a generalized ordinal potential then it cannot have any non-trivial cyclic
improvement path. We provide a counterexample, i.e., an example of G having a non-trivial
cyclic improvement path. Let f(z) = wz with a constant w such that 0 < w ≤ 1. Then,
for the game G = (S, f) with S = [0, 3], player 1’s payoffs at integer points are as given in
Figure 1. By Proposition 3.1, this game is a best-response potential game if 12f(0) ≥ f(32),
i.e., if w ≤ (12)
2
3 . The rounded payoff values when w = 12 are as shown in Figure 1. As we
can see, we have a cyclic improvement path (2, 0)→ (1, 0)→ (1, 3)→ (2, 3)→ (2, 0).
0 1 2 3
0 w
3−1
2 lnw
w
1
2−1
lnw
w−1
lnw
w
3
2−1
lnw
1 w
2+w
1
2−2
lnw
w2+w−2
2 lnw
w+w
1
2−2
lnw
2w−2
lnw
2 2w−2lnw
w+w
1
2−2
2 lnw
w2+w−2
2 lnw
w2+w
1
2−2
lnw
3 w
3
2−1
lnw
w−1
lnw
w
1
2−1
lnw
w3−1
2 lnw
(a)
0 1 2 3
0 0.631 0.423 0.721 0.933
1 1.505 0.902 1.144 1.443
2 1.443 1.144 0.902 1.505
3 0.933 0.721 0.423 0.631
(b)
Figure 1: A game having a non-trivial cyclic improvement path (player 1’s payoff when
S = [0, 3] and w = 12).
4 Concluding remarks
1. Let G = (S, f) and S = [0, L]. We have shown that if f is strictly decreasing and satisfies
1
2f(0) ≥ f(L2 ) then G admits a continuous best-response potential (Proposition 3.1) but
may not be a generalized ordinal potential game (Proposition 3.3). The existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium follows from the continuity of the best-response potential P defined by (7).
In general, the same continuous function P is a quasi-potential if f is a strictly decreasing
function (Proposition 3.2), and such a G has a unique equilibrium up to player symmetry
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(see fn. 6). Clearly, G with a constant f also has a continuous quasi-potential and a unique
equilibrium (L2 ,
L
2 ).
2. Let G = (S, f) with a strictly decreasing f . Then we can locate the unique (up to
player symmetry) equilibrium (x1, x2) of G in the following way.
7 Suppose x2 ≤ L2 . Here
x2 6= 0, since otherwise (x1, x2) = (L, 0), and u1(, 0) >
∫ L
 f(z)dz >
∫ L
2
0 f(z)dz = u1(L, 0)
for a sufficiently small  > 0, a contradiction. Note that for (x1, x2) with x2 ∈]0, L2 [ (and
x1 ∈]L2 , L[), we have ∂∂x1u1(x1, x2) = −f(L− x1) + 12f(x1−x22 ) as in (11), so ∂∂x1u1(x1, x2) =
−f(x2)+ 12f(L2−x2) by x1+x2 = L. Also −f(0)+ 12f(L2 ) < 0 by the strict decreasingness of f ,
and −f(x2)+ 12f(L2 −x2) is strictly increasing in x2 over ]0, L2 [ due to the strict decreasingness
of f . Therefore, if −f(L2 ) + 12f(0) > 0, then (x1, x2) is found by solving
−f(x2) + 1
2
f(
L
2
− x2) = 0, (13)
with x1 = L − x2. Eq. (13) is the first order condition ∂∂x1u1(x1, x2) = 0 that has to be
satisfied at the equilibrium (x1, x2) such that x2 < x1. If −f(L2 ) + 12f(0) ≤ 0, then (13)
fails at every x2 ∈]0, L2 [, and recalling that x2 6= 0, we must have (x1, x2) = (L2 , L2 ). The last
condition 12f(0) ≤ f(L2 ) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the Principle of Minimum
Differential to hold (Anderson et al., 1992). Thus, with Proposition 3.1, G = (S, f) such that
1
2f(0) = f(
L
2 ) is a game that admits a continuous best-response potential and the Principle.
3. We have shown that any G = (S, f) in this paper has some potential function, among
which the quasi-potential function is the most general one. A further generalization of
potential function is possible: replace ‘ ⇐⇒ ’ in (6) with ‘ ⇐= ’. Such a potential function
may be called a weak quasi-potential function. Note that the continuity of f is not used
in the part of the proof of Proposition 3.2, where ‘ ⇐= ’ in (6) is being proved. Thus,
G = (S, f) with a strictly decreasing not necessarily continuous f can be said to be a weak
quasi-potential game.
4. As a final remark, we note that: If the strategy set is circular (as in Salop (1979)),
then the two-person location games with payoff functions given by (1) is an exact potential
game. The proof is straightforward. The game is then an identical interest game, which is
an exact potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
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